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Abstract—Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of
applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might
impose some privacy threats on users’ “Personally Identifiable
Information” (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII,
and as such, privacy-aware users wish to maximize it. This
privacy can be, for instance, threatened by a company, which
collects users’ traces and shares them with third parties. To
maximize their location privacy, users can decide to get offline
so that the company cannot localize their devices. The longer
a user stays connected to a network, the more services he
might receive, but his location privacy decreases. In this paper,
we analyze the trade-off between location privacy, the level of
services that a user experiences, and the profit of the company.
To this end, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game between
the User (follower) and the Company (leader). We present
theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of the game. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the
economically rational decision-making of the service provider
(i.e., the Company) in conjunction with the rational decision-
making of users who wish to protect their location privacy. To
evaluate the performance of our approach, we have used real-data
from a testbed, and we have also shown that the game-theoretic
strategy of the Company outperforms non-strategic methods.
Finally, we have considered different User privacy types, and
have determined the service level that incentivizes the User to
stay connected as long as possible.
Index Terms—Game theory, localization, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of smartphones brings to end users not only
new applications and services but also privacy risks. These
risks are due to the possible disclosure of vast amount of
private information. In this paper, we investigate how location
privacy is affected by the amount of time a User is connected
to a wireless local area network (WLAN). We propose a game-
theoretic model to capture the interaction between a Company
and a User. The former offers some services to the latter, while
he is connected to a WLAN that belongs to the Company.
We assume that the Company uses a wireless communication
technology to localize users in order to increase its profits by
launching targeted advertisements or by selling User location
data to third parties. It is worth noting here that our analysis
is not restricted to localization within a WLAN. It can, for
instance, be rectified to increase location privacy in scenarios
where phones can be tracked without using their GPS or WiFi
data, e.g. by studying only their power usage over time, as
in [1].
Our work is motivated by the observation that location dis-
closure entails different privacy risks, and we can realistically
say that the location data is valuable to the Company. Suppose,
for example, that the Company has established its wireless
network within a shopping centre. The location data of the
visitors can be utilized for:
• optimization of stores: the Company can optimize the
store design based on heat-maps of customer movements;
• targeted advertisements: if the Company knows the loca-
tion of customers, it can send product information based
on their location, creating location-based spam;
• profiling: from the User’s long-term location information,
the Company can create profiles, and use them for strate-
gic decisions, or even sell this information to third parties.
In order to obtain the desired location data, the Company
establishes a passive localization system based on signal in-
formation (e.g., Received Signal Strength (RSS)) of the users’
devices. During connection time, the User can be localized
and therefore the more the User stays connected, the more
location traces can be collected by the Company. The latter
offers services to the User, which can compensate the location
privacy loss. These services may include free broadband
access, geolocation services, and discounts for certain products
or lotteries.
This paper is organized as follows. The system model,
including both the Company and the User, is described in
Section II. In Section III, we formulate the Location Privacy
Game (LPG) by defining the players’ strategies, types, and
payoffs. Section IV is dedicated to the theoretical analysis
presenting the equilibria conditions of the game, and deriving
the User’s best response and the Company’s optimal strategy
in LPG. In Section V, we present the performance evaluation
results, which demonstrate the effectiveness of our game-
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theoretic approach. The related work is discussed in Section
VI, while Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In our model, we assume a Company which controls the
communication infrastructure (CI) (e.g., WiFi network) of a
building (e.g., a shopping centre) and offers services to the
visitors when they are connected to CI. We consider the User
as the entity that can utilize these services, and at the same
time, he can be located by the Company, which leads to
suffering some location privacy loss. For a list of symbols
used in this paper, see Table I.
A. Passive Localization System
We assume that the Company maintains a passive indoor
localization system to determine the location l(τ) of the
User at time τ . The passive localization system determines
a location estimate lest(τ), which is an approximation of
the User’s true location at time τ . The precision of this
approximation is determined by the number of data packets
that the User transmits per second, i.e., the more data the User
sends the more precise lest(τ) becomes; however, modeling
this relationship is out of the scope of this paper. This approach
is different from cases where the User actively reports his
location in order to use LBSs [2], [3], as we assume that
localization occurs without the User’s active participation.
Any position estimate lest(τ) is biased with an error
lerr(τ) := ‖l(τ)− lest(τ)‖ . (1)
As the User is moving, lerr(τ) can take different values (i.e.,
lerr(τ) is a random variable). We denote the expected value
E[lerr(τ)] by lˆ.
B. Location Privacy
We assume that the User is roaming within the Company’s
area for time T ∈ Z, but his device stays connected to the CI
of the Company only for time t ∈ R : δ ≤ t ≤ T , where δ is
very small value. We have assumed here that every User needs
some minimal amount of connection time δ, for example, in
order to become aware of the services that the Company offers.
The lower the value of t, the lower the location privacy loss
of the User, as the User can be located only during t, since
there are no data packets transmitted when the User is not
connected. Then, the Users’ location privacy, when connected
to CI for time t, equals
p(t) :=
T
t
lˆ. (2)
In order to increase his location privacy, the User seeks a
minimum t with respect to some minimum required service
level, which will define later in this section. This is based on
the assumption that the longer the User stays connected, the
higher level of service he receives.
C. User Types
In this paper, we assume that there are multiple User types.
This is motivated by real-world scenarios where a company
TABLE I
LIST OF SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
lˆ Expected localization error
T User visiting time
A Set of User types
αi Likelihood of the User being of type i
Πi Privacy factor for type i User
ti Connection time of type i User
pi Location privacy of type i User
δ Very small value, lower bound of the connection time
S Company’s offered service level
S∗ Upper bound of Company’s offered service level
Sˆ Expected service level
σ User experienced service level
Θ Unit service cost
Ξ Unit service benefit
φj Probability of the j-th service level to be chosen
SU Set of User’s pure strategies
SC Set of Company’s pure strategies
µi Threshold value of the offered expected service level,
where the best response strategy of type i User changes
provides some services and several users (i.e., of different
types) are roaming within its service area. The User type
is determined by the User’s preference to protect his location
privacy. For a User of type i ∈ A, where A is the set of User
types, his privacy preferences are modeled by Πi ∈ [0, 1],
which we call the privacy factor. For instance, Πi = 1 models
a User who completely ignores the service provided by the
Company in favor of maximizing his privacy. We assume that
Πi is entered by the User on his mobile device.
We let ti denote the connection time that a User of type
i chooses. Thus, the location privacy of User type i, for
connection time ti, is given by pi = Tti lˆ, where we denote
pi(ti) by pi for convenience.
D. Offered and Experienced Service Level
We assume that the Company can offer a service level
S ∈ Z, with 0 < S ≤ S∗, to the User. The service level
S represents the highest possible additive level of the offered
services. We differ the User’s experienced service level σ(t, S)
from S, and we assume that σ(t, S) = S if and only if the
User stays connected for t = T ; otherwise, σ(t, S) < S. It is
easy to see that the highest possible service level that the User
can experience equals S∗, and it can be obtained only when
the Company offers S∗ and the User chooses t = T .
The experienced service level σ(t, S) is modeled as a linear
non-decreasing function. In practice, σ(t, S) is discrete (i.e.,
the Company gives out a discount or not). Therefore, σ(t, S)
gets a connection time t and an offered service level, and it
provides an attainable discrete service level as follows
σ(t, S) :=
t
T
S. (3)
III. LOCATION PRIVACY GAME
In this section, we define the Location Privacy Game (LPG),
which is a 2-player Bayesian Stackelberg game between the
Company C and the User U . In the LPG, the leader (Company)
first commits to his strategy, which is observed by the follower
(User). The Bayesian extension to the Stackelberg game allows
us to capture multiple types of followers, where each follower
has its own payoff values. We denote the set of User types by
A, and the User is of type i with probability αi, decided by
Nature [4].
A. Strategies
In the LPG, the Company decides upon the offered service
level S with knowledge of the probability distribution over
the different User types. On the other hand, the User wants to
consume some of these services while respecting his location
privacy preferences. The Company advertises S, and the User
can observe this and play his best response by choosing
an optimal t. The Company wishes that the User will stay
connected for as long as possible, and therefore, to be able to
construct the entire path that the User has followed; however,
each offered service level has a cost, which increases with
S. This cost is modeled by the monotonically increasing
function ΘS, where Θ is a positive constant called the unit
service cost. We also assume that the Company benefits
from tracking the User’s location, for example, by selling his
location data to third parties. We model the Company’s benefit
as a monotonically increasing function of t, which is given by
Ξ 1p(t) , where Ξ is a positive constant called the unit service
benefit.
The pure strategy choice of the Company is to offer a service
level S, and we express its strategy set as SC := {1, . . . , S∗}.
We also express the set of the User’s pure strategies as SU :=
[δ, T ]. Note that, for the remainder of this paper, we will denote
the j-th service level by Sj , and the connection time chosen
by a User of type i is denoted by ti, as mentioned earlier.
A player’s mixed strategy is a distribution over the set of his
pure strategies. For the Company, the canonical representation
of its mixed-strategy space is a discrete probability distribution
over the set SC . We represent a mixed strategy of the Company
as an |SC |-dimensional vector Φ, where φj is the probability
of offering the j-th service level. In the LPG, we assume that
the User plays only pure strategies, since there always exists a
pure strategy that is a best response for the User, as it is also
explained in [5].
B. Payoffs
1) Company: For a given User type i and strategy profile
(Φ, ti), the Company’s payoff is
U (i)C (Φ, ti) := Ξ
1
pi
−Θ
∑
j∈SC
φj Sj
=
Ξ
T
1
lˆ
ti −Θ
∑
j∈SC
φj Sj . (4)
This payoff is in the form Ψ ti−Θ
∑
j∈SC
φj Sj , where Ψ,Θ,
are positive constants, and
Ψ =
Ξ
T
1
lˆ
. (5)
The overall expected payoff of the Company is a weighted
combination of its expected payoff against all user types. We
represent the Users’ strategies, one per each type, as an |A|-
dimensional vector t = [ti], where ti ∈ SU . Then, from
Eq. (4), we have that the Company’s overall expected payoff
is
UC(Φ, t) =
∑
i∈A
αi · U (i)C (Φ, ti)
=
∑
i∈A
αi
[
Ψ ti −Θ
∑
j∈SC
φj Sj
]
. (6)
2) User: For a given offered service level S and connection
time ti, the User’s payoff is determined by both the achieved
privacy and the experienced service level as follows:
U (i)U (S, ti) := Πi pi + (1−Πi)σ(ti, S)
= Πi T lˆ
1
ti
+ (1−Πi) 1
T
S ti, (7)
which is in the form Ψ1 1ti +Ψ2 S ti, where Ψ1,Ψ2 are positive
constants, for a specific User type i, and{
Ψ1 = Πi T lˆ
Ψ2 = (1−Πi) 1T .
(8)
Hence, the User’s payoff for a mixed strategy Φ of the
Company is
U (i)U (Φ, ti) = Ψ1
1
ti
+ Ψ2 ti
∑
j∈SC
φj Sj . (9)
It is easy to see that there is a trade-off between location
privacy and experienced service quality level when choosing t.
For instance, staying connected for long time leads to high σ
but low p, and vice versa.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the analysis, our goal will be to find the User’s best
response and the Company’s optimal strategies, which are
defined as follows.
Definition 1: A User strategy is a best response if it
maximizes the User’s payoff, taking the Company’s offered
service level as given.
The standard solution concept for Stackelberg games is the
Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) [6].
Definition 2: At the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE)
of the LPG
1) for every type i, the User of type i plays a best-response
t∗ to any Company strategy Φ, that is,
U (i)U (Φ, t∗) ≥ U (i)U (Φ, t), ∀ t 6= t∗;
2) the Users break ties in favor of the Company, that is,
when there are multiple best responses to a Company
strategy Φ, the Users play the best responses t∗ that
maximize the Company’s payoff:
UC(Φ, t∗) ≥ UC(Φ, t), ∀ t best response;
3) the Company plays a best-response Φ∗, which maxi-
mizes its payoff given that the Users’ strategies are given
by the first two conditions (i.e., Users always play best
responses with tie-breaking in favor of the Company):
UC(Φ∗, t∗(Φ)) ≥ UC(Φ, t∗(Φ)), ∀Φ,
where t∗(Φ) denotes the Users best responses with tie-
breaking to a Company strategy Φ.
Note that, in our game, the tie-breaking rule has no practical
implications, it merely eliminates some pathological math-
ematical cases where the game would have no equilibrium
otherwise.
Since the Company’s equilibrium strategies maximize its
payoff, given that Users maximize their own payoffs, we will
refer to them as optimal strategies for the remainder of the
paper.
Definition 3: A Company strategy is optimal if it maximizes
the Company’s payoff given that the User will always play
a best-response strategy with tie-breaking in favor of the
Company.
A. Representing the Company’s Mixed Strategies
First, observe that both the Company’s and the User’s
expected payoffs depend on the Company’s mixed strategy Φ
only through the expected service level
∑
j∈SC φj Sj . To sim-
plify our analysis, we now introduce Sˆ to denote the expected
service level. For any mixed strategy Φ of the Company, we
can compute the corresponding Sˆ as Sˆ =
∑
j∈SC φj Sj . Then,
we can express the Company’s expected payoff as
UC(Sˆ, t) =
∑
i∈A
αi
[
Ψ ti −Θ Sˆ
]
(10)
and the User’s expected payoff as
U (i)U (Sˆ, ti) = Ψ1
1
ti
+ Ψ2 ti Sˆ. (11)
Furthermore, it is also clear that, for any Sˆ ∈
[minj∈SC Sj ,maxj∈SC Sj ], there exists a mixed strategy Φ
for the Company such that
∑
j∈SC φj Sj = Sˆ. Hence, we
can use Sˆ ∈ [minj∈SC Sj ,maxj∈SC Sj ] to represent the
Company’s mixed strategies, and the problem of finding an
optimal strategy reduces to finding an optimal Sˆ value.
B. User’s Best Response
In order to find an optimal strategy for the Company, we
first have to characterize the Users’ best-response strategies.
Lemma 1: For any Company strategy Sˆ, the User’s best
response is either δ or T .
Proof: The domain of the payoff function U (i)U (Sˆ, ti)
is ti in [δ, T ]. Then, we can compute the first derivative of
U (i)U (Sˆ, ti) with respect to ti as ∂U
(i)
U
∂ti
= −Ψ1 1t2i + Ψ2 Sˆ.
Next, we can compute the second derivative of U (i)U (Sˆ, ti)
with respect to ti as
∂2U(i)U
∂t2i
= 2 Ψ1
1
t3i
+ 0 > 0. Since the
second derivative is always positive on [δ, ti], we have that
the payoff function U (i)U (Sˆ, ti) is a convex function of ti. It
follows from the convexity of the function that the maximum
payoff is attained at one of the endpoints δ and T . Therefore,
the User’s best response is either δ or T .
Theorem 1: If User of type i plays a best-response strategy
and breaks ties in favor of the Company, then his strategic
choice for a Company strategy Sˆ is
• ti = δ if Sˆ < µi,
• ti = T if Sˆ ≥ µi,
where
µi =
Ψ1
Ψ2
1
δ T
. (12)
The above theorem basically shows that the User’s best
response is a non-decreasing right-continuous step function
of Sˆ (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). Note that, if the threshold
µi is outside the interval [minj∈SC Sj ,maxj∈SC Sj ], then the
best response is constant.
Sˆ
ti
δ
T
minj∈SC Sj µi maxj∈SC Sj
Fig. 1. Illustration of the User’s best response with tie-breaking as a function
of the Company’s strategy Sˆ.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we have that the User’s strategic
choice is either δ or T . Since the Company’s payoff is always
an increasing function of ti, the User has to choose T if both
δ and T are best responses, as the User breaks ties in favor of
the Company. Hence, it remains to characterize the case when
δ is the only best response. The strategy δ is a better response
than the strategy T if and only if
U (i)U (Sˆ, δ) > U (i)U (Sˆ, T )⇒
Ψ1
δ
+ Ψ2 δ Sˆ >
Ψ1
T
+ Ψ2 T Sˆ
⇒ Ψ1 (1
δ
− 1
T
) > Ψ2 Sˆ (T − δ)⇒ Ψ1 T − δ
δ T
>
Ψ2 Sˆ (T − δ)⇒ Sˆ < Ψ1
Ψ2
1
δ T
. (13)
C. Company’s Optimal Strategy
Lemma 2: Suppose that we are given a set of User strategies
t = (t1, t2, . . . , tSU ), and the Company’s strategy space is
limited to Sˆ values for which t is a best response. Then, the
Company’s payoff is a strictly decreasing function of Sˆ.
Proof: We can reformulate the Company’s payoff func-
tion as
UC(Sˆ) =
∑
i∈A αi
[
Ψ ti −Θ Sˆ
]
= −Θ︸︷︷︸
<0
Sˆ +
∑
i∈A
αi
[
Ψ ti
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant
. (14)
Hence, on this limited strategy space, the Company’s payoff
is a strictly decreasing function of Sˆ.
Theorem 2: The Company’s optimal strategy is either
minj∈SC Sj or one of the threshold values µi defined in
Theorem 1.
Proof: The Users’ threshold values µ1, µ2, . . . , µ|SU | di-
vide the Company’s strategy space [minj∈SC Sj ,maxj∈SC Sj ]
into at most |SU | + 1 contiguous intervals. From Lemma 2,
we have that the Company’s payoff is strictly decreasing on
each one of these intervals. From Lemma 1, we have that each
of these intervals is left-closed (see Fig. 2 for an illustration).
Therefore, the Company’s payoff attains its maximum at one
of the left endpoints, that is, either at minj∈SC Sj or at one
of the threshold values µi.
Sˆ
UC
minj∈SC Sj µ1 µ2 maxj∈SC Sj
Fig. 2. Illustration of the Company’s expected payoff as a function of its
strategy Sˆ. In this figure, the optimal strategy is µ1.
V. RESULTS
For the purposes of this section, we have used a wireless
(IEEE 802.11) localization testbed to derive realistic expected
localization error lˆ values, which we have then used to derive
the payoffs of the Company and the User. We have under-
taken simulations to compare the payoffs of different User
types. Additionally, we have compared the Bayesian Company
strategy with a strategy that assumes that all the Users have
the same average Πi value. Finally, we have demonstrated
the benefit of our game-theoretic solution as opposed to non-
strategic decisions.
For this case study, we define the set of possible expected
service levels as {1, 2, . . . , 10}. Since LPG is a Stackelberg
game, the User is aware of these service levels and he chooses
the one that maximizes his payoff. On the other hand, the
Company chooses an optimal Sˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. In our
testbed, the measurement stations (MSs) are devices that
use the IEEE 802.11 protocol (i.e., WiFi) and their wireless
cards are set into monitor mode. We performed practical
measurements by using an IEEE 802.11 testbed. We have
generated Received Signal Strength (RSS) values as inputs
to our localization algorithm. To generate these values, we
use the formula [7]
PRi = P0(d0)− 10ni log10
di
d0
+X, where (15)
• PRi is the received power at station i;
• P0(d0) is a reference power measured at distance d0;
• ni is the path loss exponent, which depends on the
environment between User and measurement station i;
• di is the distance between MS i and User’s device;
• X is a zero-mean log-normal distributed random variable
reflecting the flat fading with standard deviation X .
We have used a Nexus 4 mobile device, which sends 1000
packets per second, and we have selected twelve locations
where the User could be. We have taken 1000 measurements
at each of these locations, for 4 directions, resulting in 4000
measurements for each location. By averaging these measure-
ments we have derived ni = 0.75 ∀i, d0 = 0.7 meters,
P0(d0) = −59, and X = 1. We use the previously identified
values and (15) to simulate and derive a mean localization
error when different number of packets are sent by the User
device. The latter affect the localization error because of
the flat fading X . Therefore, we use 1000 random locations
from the interval [0, 10] × [0, 10] and locate the User using
multilateration [8, p. 164]. We assume three different values
1000, 500, and 200 for the amount of data sent by a device
resulting in the mean localization errors 40.12m, 46.64m,
and 58.04m, correspondingly. The errors depend strongly on
the environment and obstacles (e.g., moving people, walls) in
the propagation path. We also see that multilateration does
not perform well at all. However, the performance of this
localization system falls out of the scope of this paper.
Following the results of Westin [9], we classify the users
into the following three categories: Privacy Fundamentalists
(PFs); Privacy Unconcerned (PUs); and Privacy Pragmatists
(PPs). According to [9], PFs “reject the consumer-benefit or
societal-protection claims for data uses and sought legal-
regulatory privacy measure;” PUs are “ready to supply their
personal information to business and government and reject
what is seen as too much privacy fuss;” and PPs “examine the
benefits to them of the data collection and use, want to know
the privacy risks and how organizations propose to control
those, and then decide whether to trust the organization or
seek legal oversight.” Therefore, we define the set of User
types as A = {PU,PP,PF}, and we set their corresponding
privacy factors Πi as {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. We have simulated a
scenario where the User’s minimal connection time is δ = 2,
and the unit service benefit Ξ is 50% higher than the unit
service cost Θ. Note that the above privacy factor values
have been chosen for the purpose of evaluating our model
and they should not be considered as a recommendation from
the literature. We also recognize that in real-life scenarios we
might notice the “privacy paradox”, according to which people
tend to express extreme privacy preferences but act differently,
in a rather erratic way. However, in our work here, we assume
that users are rational entities whose actions are consistent
with their privacy preferences.
Fig. 3 shows the Company’s payoff for the different mean
localization error values, as discussed previously. We notice
that for lˆ = 40.12m, UC becomes negative when T = 17, and
for both lˆ = 46.64m and lˆ = 58.04m, when T = 7. These
low values of total connection time demonstrate the need for
an effective localization system, if the Company decides to
Fig. 3. Company’s payoff for different number of packets sent by the User
device.
implement the model discussed in this paper.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume that lˆ = 2m.
In Fig. 4 we compare the payoffs arising from the optimal
Bayesian Company strategy and from the optimal “Averaging
strategy.” Both strategies are evaluated in the Bayesian model,
assuming that User types are uniformly distributed. The former
strategy considers the differences between the User types,
and as a result, correctly assumes that the privacy factor Πi
is drawn from {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} uniformly at random. On the
other hand, the Averaging strategy assumes that the users
are homogeneous and that the privacy factor always takes its
expected value 0.5 (i.e., assumes a single User type which
has the average Π value 0.5). This comparison allows us to
determine how much the Company can gain from knowing the
actual distribution of the User types. For visiting time T = 84
minutes, the Company’s payoff decreases with T for both
strategies. However, we notice that the Bayesian Company
strategy outperforms the Averaging strategy when T > 36.
Furthermore, the Averaging and Bayesian strategies give neg-
ative payoffs for T > 51, and T > 82 correspondingly. Given
that when negative payoffs are reached the Company must
rather decide not to provide any services, the Bayesian strategy
gives 31 minutes extra time for the Company to make profit.
More importantly, in Fig. 5 we show how the Company
benefits from following the Stackelberg strategy as opposed
to non-strategic decisions, such as the maximum Sˆ value 10,
the minimum Sˆ value 1, and also the weighted Sˆ value. The
latter is given by first assuming that the Company chooses as
expected service levels [2, 5, 8] when the User privacy factors
are [0.2, 0.5, 0.8]. Secondly, the Company multiplies each Sˆ
value by the probability αi of a User being of type i.
Following the results of [9], we have used the probability
distribution α = [α1, α2, α3] = [0.2, 0.55, 0.25] over A and,
therefore, over {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} for the Bayesian model. We
assume that the Company is aware of α. Thus, the Company
can compute its optimal expected service level, by using
Eq. (10). It is easy that, for the weighted strategy, given α,
we have that Sˆ = 0.2 · 2 + 0.55 · 5 + 0.25 · 8 = b5.15c = 5.
First, we notice that for all of the Sˆ values, the Company’s
Fig. 4. Comparing a Bayesian with an Averaging strategy for the Company.
Fig. 5. Comparing the payoff of the Company for different non-strategic
decisions and the strategy at the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE).
payoff is a decreasing function of the User’s visiting time T in
this Bayesian model. More specifically, the results show that
if the Company chooses the Max strategy, its payoff becomes
negative for T > 10, while for the Min strategy, the Company
can keep providing services for 21 extra minutes (T = 31),
before its payoff becomes negative. This time is improved by
20 minutes when the Company chooses the weighted value,
leading to T = 51 before its payoff becomes negative. The
best performance is achieved when the Company chooses
the Sˆ determined by the Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium of
the LPG. This allows the Company to make profit (i.e.,
having positive payoff), for 57 minutes. Although the 6 extra
minutes improvement of the Company’s payoff per User is not
remarkable, we must note that such an improvement leads to
significantly higher Company profits when considering a high
number of users, as in realistic scenarios.
It is also worth noting that for T > 51, the Company’s
payoff decreases significantly (reaching −6.529), when the
weighted value is chosen. On the other hand, although the
Company’s payoff becomes negative for T > 57, its value
remains−0.0184 for the rest of the simulated time. This can be
useful if we assume that the Company occasionally decides not
to stop offering services immediately after its payoff becomes
Fig. 6. Payoffs of the different User types at the SSE of the LPG.
negative, in favor of its Users.
Besides investigating the Company’s payoff, we have looked
into the payoffs of different User types, when the User plays
his best response according to Definition 2. In Fig. 6, we have
plotted these payoffs for the same parameters Θ, Ξ, α as in the
above results, and different visiting times T . We observe that
for a Privacy Fundamentalist (PF), the payoff increases as a
function of the visiting time, even from the very first minute. In
contrast, the payoff of a Privacy Pragmatist (PP) User equals 0
for visiting times less than 60 minutes. For higher values than
this, the User payoff becomes positive taking the value 3.0.
Thereafter, for T > 60 PP’s payoff only increases. Finally, the
payoff of a Privacy Unconcerned (PU) User, remains 0 for the
visiting time values lower than 74. At this point, the payoff
becomes 1.85, and thereafter it only increases. However, it
remains lower than the PP’s payoff for the rest of the time.
Note that, both PP’s and PU’s payoffs are lower than the PF’s
payoff at all times, highlighting that the latter is the most
favored User type in our model.
Finally, in Fig. 7, we can see the thresholds for the different
User types as a function of the visiting time. As expected, the
results show that for all User types, threshold values increase
with the visiting time. This means that the higher the visiting
time T , the higher the expected service level Sˆ must be for
the User to stay connected for T , as opposed to remaining
connected for a small δ. This happens because the User is
more concerned about his location privacy for longer visiting
periods; therefore, he has to receive a higher Sˆ in order to
consider it worthwhile (i.e., best response) to be connected to
the CI of the Company for T .
Given that Sˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}, the results show that a PF
User will not get connected for more than δ minutes when
the visiting time T exceeds 34 minutes, regardless of the
expected service level Sˆ, offered by the Company. Likewise,
a PP User considers staying connected to the Company’s CI
for the whole visiting time, for T values only up to 101
minutes, if the required Sˆ is offered. Lastly, a PU User can stay
connected for the maximum simulation time T = 180, for the
Fig. 7. Threshold values, in terms of offered expected service levels, where
the User’s best response changes, for the different User types.
“right” Sˆ value. To have a more clear view on how quickly Sˆ
must increase to satisfy the requirements of the different User
types, we have derived the slope of each threshold function
for each User type. For this derivation, we have computed
the derivative of µi with respect to T . Thus, from (12), we
have ∂µi∂T =
∂
Ψ1
Ψ2
1
δ T
∂T =
Ψ1
Ψ2
1
δ =
Πi lˆ
(1−Πi) δ . From this, we found
the following slope values: PU: 0.033, PP: 0.1, and PF: 0.3.
We notice that, for the same visiting time, a PF User requires
a 3 times higher Sˆ offered than a PP User, in order to stay
connected for T , and 9 times higher Sˆ offered than a PU User.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss state-of-the-art work at the
intersection of game theory and location privacy. A thorough
survey related to this has been published by Manshaei et
al. [2]. The majority of the papers model two players: the
attacker and the user.
According to [10], in order to design an optimal privacy-
protection mechanism it is crucial to take the knowledge of an
attacker into consideration. This means, for example, that the
adversary is aware of the utilized location protection algorithm
and the access profile of the user i.e., the probability distri-
bution describing the user access to Location-based services
(LBS) in a certain region. This assumes, that the user contacts
the LBS sporadically.
Shokri et al. [10] provide a framework to methodologically
integrate this knowledge by using a zero-sum Bayesian Stack-
elberg game in order to derive the optimal protection strategy.
In their scenario, the user is the leader and the adversary is the
follower. They build on the correctness metric explained above
to measure the users’ location privacy. Their game consists of
four steps. First, the Nature selects a location r for the user
to access the LBS. Second, the user protects his/her location
by creating a pseudo-location r′ with a function f . Third, the
attacker observes r′ and tries to infer r using the knowledge of
f and the access profile of the user resulting in an estimation
rˆ. Finally, the adversary pays an amount d(r, rˆ) to the user.
Here d(·) is a distance function and represents the estimation
error of the adversary. The authors derive optimal strategies
for both, user and adversary.
Furthermore, Shokri et al. [11] present a privacy preserving
approach relying on user-collaboration. Their solution, called
MobiCrowd, requires the mobile devices to communicate
wirelessly and in a peer-to-peer manner. The mobile devices
keep their context information in a buffer, until it expires,
and they pass it to other collaborative users seeking such
information. This leads to less communication with the service
provider because a user contacts the provider only if there are
no other users, with the requested information, in range. In
this initial work no game theory is used but it is the basis
for [12], where Santos et al. extend their work by analyzing
the collaborative behavior of users in MobiCrowd with game-
theoretic methods. The two Nash game equilibria, which they
have derived, favor mutual cooperation and mutual defection.
In a second game they combine game theoretic analysis with
an epidemic model to investigate the behavior of more than
two users. In this way, they derive the optimal threshold αopt
for cooperation that optimizes the payoff of a user.
Chorppath and Alpcan [13] establish a privacy mechanism-
design game between a company and its mobile users. The
company offers incentives to the users in order them to
report their location with a certain level of accuracy. The
authors derive the total budget that a company must invest
on providing incentives to obtain a desired minimum level of
location accuracy from all the users.
As far as we know, all above papers make the assumption
that users actively report their location in order to use LBSs.
They also look into anonymity issues, and they aim to de-
couple the user identity from his location. However, modern
devices do not come with the capability of changing, for
instance, their users MAC address, and therefore confusing
the attacker about their real identity.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first game-
theoretic approach investigating users’ strategies in a passive
localization environment, where location is derived by raw
signal measurements, and the only parameter that the user can
control is the amount of connection time. Finally, our work
is innovative, as it is the first one to model the economically-
rational decision-making of the service provider in conjunction
with rational decision-making of the users who wish to protect
their location privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a game-theoretic model, in which a
Company incentivizes a User to permit location tracking, by
offering “attractive” service levels based on the different User
types. The User’s location is tracked by a passive localization
system, which is established and maintained by the Company.
We have defined a Stackelberg game, called the Location
Privacy Game (LPG), according to which a User selects the
amount of time he stays connected (i.e., connection time) to
the Company’s network (e.g., WiFi), and the Company chooses
the level of services that are offered to the User. We have
presented theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of
the game. Then, we have developed an IEEE 802.11 wireless
testbed, which facilitated the computation of different expected
localization errors for a User who is equipped with a mobile
device. We have used these values in our simulations to
demonstrate the superiority of the game-theoretic strategy
as opposed to non-strategic methods. More importantly, we
have considered different User privacy types, as published by
Westin [9], and have determined the service level that must
be provided by the Company to incentivize the User to stay
connected as long as possible to the Company’s network.
Regarding our plans for future work, an interesting and
actively explored research direction is developing information
theory-based metrics for quantifying user privacy. Therefore
modeling user and service provider decision processes using
privacy games and by integration of such metrics is another
direction that immediately follows. Furthermore, plans include
a model extension that will facilitate user privacy within the
realm of the Internet-of-Things, where localization capabilities
are more often the case than the exception.
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